This paper models and tests the implications of institutional efficiency on the pattern of FDI. We posit that domestic agents have a comparative advantage over foreign agents in overcoming some of the obstacles associated with corruption and weak institutions. Under these circumstances, FDI is more sensitive to increases in enforcement costs. We then test this prediction, comparing institutional efficiency levels for a large cross section of countries in 1989 to subsequent FDI flows 1990-9, finding that institutional efficiency is positively associated with the ratio of subsequent foreign direct investment flows to both gross fixed capital formation and to private investment.
Introduction
The large increase in FDI in recent decades has stimulated a growing empirical and theoretical literature. 1 The salient empirical regularities emerging from this literature include the finding of a hefty "multinational wage premium" -multinationals' wages exceed the wages paid by domestic producers by a significant margin, and multinationals' productivity tends to be higher than that of domestic producers. 2 The purpose of this paper is to outline and to test a model that provides an interpretation to these findings. Specifically, we identify situations where it is in multinational's self interest to pay a wage premium relative to domestic producers.
A number of previous papers have concentrated on knowledge spillovers as an argument for a multinational wage premium. Fosfuri, et al (2001) introduces a model where a multinational pays its trained workers a higher wage to induce it to resist moving to a local competitor.
Our analysis focuses instead on the role of strength in the enforcement of property rights, as measured by the domestic level of institutional efficiency, on the pattern and behavior of multinationals. Despite efforts to limit such behavior, corruption and bribery appear to be prevalent features of foreign direct investment activities. For example, Hines (1995) Wei (1997a, b) , and Smarzynska and Wei (2000) ], have posited that institutional inefficiencies such as corruption will be detrimental to both FDI and domestic investment.
The empirical evidence concerning the impact of institutional efficiency and property rights enforcement on inward investment has been mixed. Wheeler and Mody (1992) estimate a cross-country panel of manufacturing and electronics investment in which a principal component they label "Risk" includes such socio-economic factors as the Business
International indicators of corruption and bureaucratic red tape. They find no significant impact of this component on capital expenditures by U.S. multinationals. Similarly, Hines (1995) finds no measurable impact of institutional inefficiency on total inward FDI in host nations after 1977.
However, more recent studies find robust evidence that institutional inefficiency reduces the level of FDI entering into a country. Wei (2000) examines a panel of bilateral stocks of FDI from 12 source countries to 45 host countries and finds a large and statistically significant negative impact of institutional inefficiency on inward FDI. 3 His point estimates indicate that the increase in institutional inefficiency from the level of Singapore's to that of Mexico is the equivalent of a 20 percentage point increase in the tax rate on multinationals.
Similarly, Wei (1997) finds that uncertainty in institutional inefficiency levels also has a measurable negative impact on inward FDI.
While these later studies establish a negative relationship between institutional inefficiency and FDI, their results do not imply that FDI flows would be more sensitive to institutional inefficiency in the host country than domestic investment. However, the possibility that institutional inefficiency is especially harmful to FDI, i.e. relative to its adverse impact on domestic investment, is important in terms of the general consensus that FDI plays an important role in transferring technology to developing countries. 4 We conjecture that FDI will be more sensitive to institutional inefficiency than domestic investment. We posit that domestic entrepreneurs will have an advantage in overcoming institutional inefficiencies relative to their foreign competitors in overcoming some of the obstacles associated with corruption and weak institutions. This "home advantage" may be due to multitude of reasons, including better familiarity of the court system and the government, better knowledge of the key people that should be bribed and of local networks that help in resolving disputes, etc. Our model focuses on identifying testable implications of the "home advantage" on the investment patterns of domestic versus foreign entrepreneurs.
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Specifically, in section 2 we present a reduced form model where, like in Wei (2000), institutional inefficiencies depress profitability, in a way akin to a tax. We assume that the effective tax rates differ between domestic and foreign agents, and study the impact of greater institutional inefficiencies on the patterns of domestic and foreign direct investment. We show that multinational investments are more sensitive to greater institutional inefficiency.
Institutional inefficiencies tax entrepreneurs through numerous channels, including the inputs and the final output markets. In the Appendix we illustrate in one possible channel in detail, operating through the labor market, leading to a reduced form similar to the one used in the base model describe in Section 2. A similar reduced form 4 For example, see Barrel and Pain (1997) . However, see Aitken and Harrison (1999) for an opposing view. 5 The literature has dealt with other possible dimensions associated with home advantages and disadvantages of domestic versus foreign entrepreneurs. For example, Razin, Sadka and Yuen (1999) studied the implication of multinationals having access to cheaper cost credit and possibly inferior information about the quality of domestic projects relative to domestic entrepreneurs on the patterns of FDI. Our approach abstracts away from these issues, assuming equal financial costs for both domestic and foreign agents. This allows us to identify the implications of the home advantage associated with institutional inefficiency on investment. An implication of our assumptions is that, unlike in Razin et. al. (1999) , FDI unambiguously improves the host country's welfare.
may be driven via alternative channels. Specifically, the Appendix provides a detailed example of a principle agent framework with costly ex-post monitoring and enforcement of an ex-ante contract with domestic labor. The home advantage stems from our assumption that the ex-post monitoring and enforcement cost of the labor contract is lower for domestic entrepreneurs than for foreign ones. Under these disadvantages, foreign producers require a countervailing productivity advantage to compete. Given circumstances where both multinationals and domestic producers exist side-by-side, we
show that multinationals pay higher wages and are more sensitive to institutional inefficiency.
We directly examine the impact of institutional efficiency on the share of FDI in a host country's overall investment portfolio in Section 3. In particular, we estimate the impact of an index of institutional efficiency on the ratio of average FDI flows to both gross fixed capital formation and private domestic investment over the following ten years for a crosssection of nations. We find that institutional efficiency is robustly positively correlated with the ratio of FDI to total domestic investment. This suggests that institutional inefficiency discourages FDI more severely than it does domestic investment, as predicted by our theoretical model.
We then demonstrate that this result is robust to the inclusion of a number of conditioning factors associated with FDI inflows in the literature. Some of the results in the literature concern differences in characteristics between potential source and host countries.
For example, consider the expected impact of local skill endowments on the attractiveness of a host country for inward FDI. A model of vertical FDI would predict that the motivation for vertical FDI between two countries would be greater the larger is the skill advantage of the parent firm country [e.g. Carr, et al (2001) ]. However, as our sample is cross sectional, it concentrates on host country characteristics taking source country characteristics as given.
Holding parent firm characteristics constant, vertical FDI models would predict greater FDI into a host country the lower are domestic skill levels, as local production would benefit from skill-intensive management from the multinational parent.
It is by no means certain that the same prediction would hold for horizontal FDI.
Horizontal FDI might be aided by higher host country skill endowments. It follows that the prediction of the impact of local skill levels on the magnitude of inward FDI is ambiguous, depending on the relative share of vertical FDI in a host country. As such, the control variables we introduce below are not meant as a formal test of different theories of FDI against each other, but rather tests of the robustness of our observed negative correlation between institutional inefficiency and the share of FDI in a nation's investment.
Nevertheless, there are other predictions from the empirical theory on FDI flows that translate unambiguously to a cross-section. For example, it is well-known that higher hostcountry tariffs would be expected to increase FDI flows motivated by "tariff-jumping"
opportunities. This prediction would be valid in the cross-section, so the argument that FDI is increasing in host country protectionism, which clearly holds a lot of important considerations constant, would be as valid in the cross-section as it would be for bilateral data.
The remainder of this paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 introduces a simple model of institutional inefficiency and FDI. The model is extended in the appendix to allow for costly monitoring, which results in the multinational wage premium found in the literature. Section 3 introduces our empirical specification and provides a first look at our data. Section 4 reviews our results and conducts a battery of robustness testing. Section 5 concludes.
A Simple Model of Institutional inefficiency and FDI
The purpose of this section is to provide testable predictions dealing with the impact of varying institutional inefficiency on domestic and foreign direct investments. We introduce a simple model characterizing the impact of institutional inefficiency on the patterns of FDI and domestic investment. An obvious challenge is that institutional inefficiency comes in various forms, including costly enforcement of the law, tolerance for bribes as a way to overcome red tapes, setting red tapes as a mechanism to generate quasi rents to the bureaucrats, ect. A way to by-pass the challenge of modeling the wide spectrum of institutional inefficiency is to apply Wei (2000) 's insight, viewing institutional inefficiency as a private tax, reducing profits. In this section we adopt this reduced form approach. We examine a more detailed example in the appendix that characterizes the impact of institutional inefficiency for an economy where firms face a principal-agent problem vis-à-vis their laborers, with costly ex-post monitoring and enforcement of an ex-ante contract.
Specifically, we assume that there is a sector containing two firms, a multinational subsidiary and a domestic firm. Institutional inefficiency is assumed to tax the FDI at a higher rate than the domestic firm. The FDI is assumed to co-exist with domestic production, where the technological superiority of foreign subsidiaries and the relative superiority of domestic firms concerning the agency problem lead to an interior solution for the share of FDI in host-country investment.
The production functions of the domestic and foreign firms are assumed to be CobbDouglas in capital, K, and labor, L. We distinguish the foreign firm with stars. The production function of the domestic firm is assumed to satisfy
Similarly, the foreign firm production function is assumed to satisfy
The decision problems faced by the domestic and foreign entrepreneurs are identical.
The domestic entrepreneur sets the contract in order to maximize the expected profits V,
where the cost of capital is equal to 
Proof:
Denoting the optimal stock of capital in the domestic firm by K , it follows from the first order conditions of profit maximization that
Hence, the greater is the cost of institutional inefficiency; the lower will be the ratio of foreign direct investment to domestic investment. The greater is the tax gap 1 − ψ , the larger is the drop of the relative capital share K K/ * induced by a given increase in institutional inefficiency.
Empirics

Methodology
In this section, we test the above theory for a cross-section of countries using data on institutional efficiency empirically.
We first estimate the following specification
where / FDI GCFC represents the average ratio of inward foreign direct investment to gross fixed capital formation from 1990 through 1999, Ineff represents the index of corruption from Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) , 6 X is a vector of factors that have been shown to be determinants of the magnitude of foreign direct investment flows in the literature, and ε represents a disturbance term that is assumed to be independently and identically distributed normal.
Our initial vector of factors includes
LGDP , the log of gross domestic product in each country. Multinationals are more likely to locate a subsidiary in a large economy, holding all else equal, to take advantage of the large local market [e.g. Markusen (2002) ]. Of course, a large local market would also encourage domestic production, so the net impact on the share of FDI in total investment is uncertain.
We also introduce variables to account for geography. LDISTUS and LDISTGER measure the log of distance from the United States and Germany respectively, with the latter reflecting overall distance from Europe. We consider these to be substitutes. For example, it is unlikely that Mexico's distance from Germany reduces its attractiveness as a host country.
Indeed, European investors have aggressively invested in Mexico to take advantage of its proximity to the United States market. Nevertheless, Markusen (2002) notes that the predicted sign on these distance variables is ambiguous, as distance may increase the desirability of FDI to reduce trade costs, but may also increase the management costs of FDI.
We also include variables to account for differences in skilled labor endowments across countries. We first include SKILL , which estimates the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor in country i , and then add SKILLGDP , which interacts the local ratio of skilled labor with the size of the local economy. The skill endowments of most of the countries in our sample will be lower than those of their source countries, so the interactive variable captures the potential for vertical FDI. Holding the parent firm skill level constant, we would expect a negative sign on both the SKILL and the interactive variable, as the ability to conduct vertical FDI would be greater the lower is the local skill level and the larger is the size of the local economy.
Finally, we introduce measures of the costs of investing in the local economy, INVC , and a measure of protectionism in each country, PROT , which were obtained from Markusen and Maskus (2002) . Of course, we expect a negative sign on local costs of investment and a positive sign on the measure of local protectionism.
Our coefficient of interest is 1 β , the impact of the institutional inefficiency index in 1989 on subsequent inward foreign direct investment as a share of gross fixed capital formation. The model is estimated using weighted least squares with observations weighted by country size using White's heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors below.
We then subject our analysis to a battery of robustness checks. First, we redo our estimation with the sub-sample of developing countries. Next, we repeat our estimation using the ratio of average inward foreign direct investment to private domestic investment, / FDI PVT , from 1990-1999. Gross fixed capital formation includes government investment. Heterogeneity in government investment may add noise to the denominator in the dependent variable in our specification above. While this specification results in a smaller sample, it provides a good check of the robustness of the gross fixed capital formation results. Finally, we subject our base specification to the inclusion of a number of additional conditioning variables to control for differences in country characteristics outside of our theory that may independently influence the relative share of FDI in investment.
Data
The Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) data are from Business International's index of institutional inefficiency, and were recently used in Mauro (1995) . 7 This index reflects the reports of analysts concerning the functioning of the domestic bureaucracy. It ranges from 0 to 10, with a grade of 10 indicating a "smoothly functioning, efficient bureaucracy" while a grade of 4 indicates "constant need for government approvals and frequent delays." We form our institutional inefficiency measure as 10 minus the Business International index.
National endowments of skilled and unskilled labor were obtained from Caselli and Coleman (2000) . Caselli and Coleman measure the unskilled share as the share of the population achieving either no schooling or some primary education, and the share of skilled labor as the remainder. 7 Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and Mauro (1995) both used an indicator of institutional efficiency. Our measure of institutional inefficiency is constructed as 10 minus the institutional efficiency indicator.
Data on investment costs and protectionism were obtained from Markusen and Maskus (2002) based on raw data from the World Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum. 9 The investment cost index includes measures of the ease of acquisition of corporations by foreigners, the ease of employing foreign workers, the ease of negotiating cross border ventures, the flexibility of local labor laws, the degree of local competition, the strength of the local legal environment, the flexibility of the local financial market, and access of local to foreign capital markets and of foreign firms to local capital markets. The protectionism index reflects the degree to which local policy prevents the import of foreign goods and services.
Remaining data, including foreign direct investment flows, gross fixed capital formation, the share of private investment in total domestic investment, and the shares of ores and metals in total exports, were obtained from the World Development Indicators.
Countries were designated as "mid-income" or "high-income" on the basis of their World
Bank classification in 1989.
Summary statistics are shown in Table 1 . Our sample includes 97 countries, 28 of which are designated as low-income and 48 of which are designated as mid-income. Using the ratio of FDI to private investment reduces the sample size to 52 countries, including 12 low-income countries and 31 mid-income countries.
Unsurprisingly, the group of low-income nations has the greatest measures of institutional inefficiency. The mean level of the index for the low-income nations is 5.69, while for the mid-income and high-income groups it is only 5.09 and 1.20 respectively.
Nevertheless there is a fair amount of disparity within all of the samples, with the low-income nations' corruption scores ranging from 3.3 to 10.0, the mid-income scores ranging from 1.67
to 10.0, and the high-income nations ranging from 0.0 to 3.3.
The disparities in the share of foreign direct investment by income level are relatively minor. Mean levels of the ratio of FDI to gross fixed capital formation range from a low value of 0.09 for the low-income countries to a high value of 0.12 for the high-income countries. The higher ratio for the high-income countries is in keeping with the literature [e.g. Markusen (2002) ] that notes that the bulk of FDI takes place between developed nations.
However, as the bulk of capital formation also takes place in developed nations, this fact does not necessarily imply that the developed nation should have higher FDI as a share of overall investment. Indeed, as a share of private investment, we find that the high-income country shares are lowest, with a mean value of 0.13, while the highest shares are found among the mid-income countries, with a share of 0.19. Nevertheless, neither of these differences are statistically significant.
The simple correlations between our Ineff index and levels of investment relative to gross domestic product for our developing nation sample are shown in Figure 1 . It can be seen that there is a modest negative relationship between institutional inefficiency and both FDI and domestic investment as measured by gross fixed capital formation. This confirms the results found in Wei (2000) . 10 We plot the simple correlation between the Ineff index and the shares of FDI in gross fixed capital formation and private investment in Figure 2 for our developing country sample. We observe a modest negative relationship between institutional inefficiency and the share of FDI, as predicted by our theory. 11 We next turn towards testing these hypotheses formally.
Results
Base Specification
Results with / FDI GCFC as the dependent variable are shown in Table 2 . It can be seen that the performance of the Ineff variable is very robust. With the sample weighted by country size, the variable enters positively and significantly either with or without controlling for host country GDP. The point estimate of -0.02 for the base specification implies an economically significant 2 percent decrease in the ratio of FDI to gross fixed capital formation for each point increase in the institutional inefficiency index.
The introduction of the distance variables in Model 3 does reduce the point estimate on the Ineff variable by 25 percent to -0.015. However, the variable still enters significantly at a five percent confidence level and the change in the point estimate is not statistically significant.
The introduction of the skill variables in Models 4 and 5 results in an increase in the absolute value of the point estimate on Ineff variable to -0.026. However, data limitations reduce this sample to 45 observations, so it is unclear whether the point estimate increase is attributable to the sample change or the change is specification. To check this, we re-ran Model 1 with the truncated sample in Model 4. Our coefficient estimate was -0.023, halfway between those of Models 1 and 4, which suggests that the point estimate increase in half attributable to the specification change and half attributable to the change in sample.
The only specification in which the Ineff variable failed to enter significantly was Model 6, which included the investment cost variable. Again, this introduction reduced the sample size, to 39 observations. 12 However, the primary reason that the Ineff variable failed to enter in this case was the high correlation between the Ineff variable and the INVC 12 Note that we removed the skill variables from our specification because their inclusion resulted in an insufficient sample size of 16 observations. However, the results were qualitatively similar to those reported in variable which equaled 61.2 percent in our sample. To verify this, we examined the base regression with the 39 observation sample size and obtained similar results to those reported in Model 1. Finally, while Model 7 which introduces the PROT variable also contains only 39 observations, the Ineff variable again enters significantly negative, albeit with only a point estimate of -0.014.
The control variables tend to enter as would be expected, although not always at statistically significant levels. Somewhat surprisingly, the coefficient on LGDP is robustly negative, suggesting that the increase in FDI with the size of the local economy is less than that of domestic investment. The distance variables enter negatively, which is consistent with the interpretation that the concerns over additional monitoring costs with distance outweigh the trade cost increases that also come with increased distance.
The SKILL variable enters significantly negatively on its own (Model 4), but is insignificant when the interactive SKILLGDP variable is introduced in Model 5. Holding source country skill levels constant, this is the predicted coefficient sign for vertical FDI, as lower local skill levels have can benefit more from source country skill advantages.
Finally, the INVC enters with its expected negative sign, but not at a statistically significant level. The PROT variable is significantly positive, which would be expected if FDI was partly motivated by tariff-jumping considerations. significant 1 percent increase in the share of FDI for every one point decrease in the institutional inefficiency index.
FDI as a share of private investment
Since heterogeneity in government investment may add noise to the denominator in the dependent variable in our specification above, we repeat our estimation using the ratio of average inward foreign direct investment to private domestic investment, / FDI PVT , from 1990-1999. This specification results in a smaller sample, but provides a good check of the robustness of the results we report for the larger sample. Table 4 displays the results with / FDI PVT as the dependent variable. As noted above, the use of this variable significantly reduces our sample size. Nevertheless, most of our results for the Ineff variable of interest appear to be robust in the full sample. For the base specification, the point estimate is -0.025, slightly higher than what was observed for the share relative to gross fixed capital formation. The Ineff variable is no longer significant with the introduction of the distance variables, although the point estimate in Model 3 is actually large in absolute value at -0.017 for the / FDI PVT specification than it was for FDI as a share of gross fixed capital formation. As before the Ineff variable is not significant when we include the INVC variable with the full sample. Moreover, in this specification we also get an insignificant coefficient estimate with the PROT variable included. The conditioning variables tend to enter with the same sign as before, but are not as robust in terms of statistical significance.
Robustness to Inclusion of Conditioning Variables
Because we are estimating a cross-section, we obviously are precluded from using panel estimators, such as country fixed and random effects, to control for differences in country characteristics outside of our theory that may independently influence the relative share of FDI in investment. To account for other possible influences, we introduce a number of conditioning variables into our specification. From the Sachs and Warner (1997) 14 Our results with the conditioning variables included are shown in Table 5 . We repeated all of the specifications in Table 1 with all of the conditioning variables included with the exception of the Sub-Saharan Africa dummy which is dropped in Models 6 and 7
due to small-sample collinearity problems. The primary result is that the Ineff variable is robust to the inclusion of these conditioning variables, again with the exception of Model 6 which includes the INVC variable. The point estimates actually appear to increase, with the base specification with the conditioning variables included yielding a point estimate exceeding 3 percent.
Conclusion
This paper introduces a model of foreign direct investment under institutional inefficiency. We demonstrated that when foreign direct investment suffered from a relative disadvantage in dealing with institutional inefficiency, it economized on its physical capital investment. This led to the conclusion that the ratio of multinational investment to domestic investment would be decreasing in institutional inefficiency.
We then tested this prediction for a cross-section of countries using data on corruption. Our results demonstrated a robust negative relationship between the level of corruption and the ratio of FDI flows to domestic investment flows.
One simplification in our model noted earlier is the implicit combination of monitoring and enforcement activities. While the domestic entrepreneur is likely to enjoy advantages in both of these activities, as specified above, one could imagine a situation where relative advantages in monitoring may differ by industry. Holding enforcement costs equal,
we may see multinational investment relatively specialized in industries in which foreign firms enjoy relative advantages in monitoring costs. For example, multinationals may enjoy managerial advantages in some industries, which may correspond to reduced monitoring costs, but may suffer from the enforcement disadvantages alluded to above.
Appendix
This Appendix outline an example of labor market imperfections that may lead to the reduced form specification outlined by equations (1)- (4). We model such circumstances in a principle agent framework with costly ex-post monitoring and enforcement of an ex-ante contract with domestic labor. The home advantage stems from our assumption that the ex-post monitoring and enforcement cost of the labor contract is lower for domestic entrepreneurs than for foreign ones. We also show that multinational investments are more sensitive to weakness (or more costly enforcement of) property rights.
The production function of the domestic firm is assumed to satisfy
where z is the effective productivity shock, the outcome of labor's effort and the realized exogenous state of
where χ is an exogenous constant, 0 < χ < 1. Labor's effort therefore contributes χ − 1 to output.
Similarly, the foreign firm production function is assumed to satisfy Moreover, we assume that the domestic firm enjoys a low cost of verifying and enforcing effort, such that 1.
ψ > However, we assume that the foreign subsidiary enjoys a countervailing productivity advantage over its domestic counterpart, so that * A A ≥ .
The opportunity cost of labor's time is assumed to equalω . 15 There are two possible labor types, differing in the amount of effort e needed to yield the high output [alternatively, two possible qualities of matches between labor and capital, differing in the effort input needed]:
with probability with probability The labor contract sets the compensation rule ex-ante. It has the following dimensions -A threshold φ of the effective productivity shock z that will trigger the costly verification and enforcement.
-In the absence of verification, or if the verification will reveal no shirking, labor would be paid L w n .
If shirking is detected, labor would be paid zero. 16 We assume that the various parameters induce a separating equilibrium, where the more efficient type (a) would supply effort, and the less efficient type (b) would shirk.
In rational-expectation equilibrium, labor would prefer putting effort to shirking if the penalty for shirking exceeds the cost of effort. Under the assumptions above, this condition satisfies This implies that the density function of effective productivity shock z is 15 The opportunity cost of labor could be alternatively interpreted as leisure or as the prevailing wage in a traditional sector. 16 Maximizing the penalty associated with shirking (i.e., paying zero when shirking is detected), is optimal.
(1 ) 1 2
The decision problems faced by the domestic and foreign entrepreneurs are identical. The domestic entrepreneur sets the contract in order to maximize the expected profits V, where
where the cost of capital is equal to ρ + 1 and ( ) E lc represents the expected cost per worker, which satisfies
Henceforth we focus on the case where the entrepreneur pays labor the reservation wage that just induces laborers of type a to supply effort: 
CLAIM:
I. An internal separating equilibrium (i.e., See text for variable definitions.
